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DAVIS v. SMITH.
A married woman, though possessing a separate estate, can make no contract
binding herself personally. or on which she or her personal representatives can be
sued at law.
King v. Mittalberger, 50 Mlo. 183, overruled.
A note made by a married woman, while she was a feme covert and possessed
of a separate estate, is not a debt against her for which her personal representative
can be sued, nor is it such a debt as can be allowed in the probate court against
the general assets of the estate in course of administration.
When a married womanu-having a separate estate, dies, it ceases to be such, and
stands like any other property she may have owned. One to whom she has incurred
an obligation while married has no right to satisfaction of his debt out of any other
of her property which is subject to the debts of her general creditors ; while the
latter, equally with the special creditor, have a right to resort to what was her
separate property for payment of their demands.
Where a married woman, possessed of a separate estate, died pending a suit in
the circuit court to charge such estate with a note executed by her while married;
the suit was properly revived against her heirs. The proper decree of the court,
where the finding is for the plaintiff in such case, stated in the opinion.
A note executed by the ancestor cannot, without proof of its execution, be read
in evidence against the heirs against whom the suit has been revived, where the
latter stand upon an answer made by their guardian denying all the allegations of
the petition.

APPEAL from Greene county.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
HENRY, J.-This was a suit originally against Harriet and
Patrick R. Smith, her husband, and Robert, as trustee of the
said Harriet, wherein it was sought to charge the separate estate
of Mrs. Smith with the payment of the balance of a note executed
by her, her husband and her said trustee, payable to the plaintit.
Mrs. Smith died while the suit was pending, and after defendants
had answered, each admitting the execution of the note, and the

husband and wife alleging her coverture when the note was executed; that she received no consideration for her signature; that
it was procured by fraud on the part of the plaintiff; that it was
not voluntarily executed .by Patrick, and that Harriet signed by
compulsion of her husband, to which plaintiff was a party, and
that she did not intend to charge her separate estate with payment of the note.

Robert's answer admitted his execution of the

note as trustee of said Harriet.

In February 1875, plaintiff filed

DAVIS v. SAIUTH.

a replication to this answer, denying all its defensive allegations.
Subsequently, Harriet died, and this suit was revived against her
heirs-at-law, and George Hubbard was appointed their guardian
ad litem, and as such filed an answer, denying all the allegations
of the petition, to which no replication was filed. The cause was
taken from the Circuit Court of Newton county, where it originated, to Greene county, by change of venue, where on a trial at the
October Term 1877, defendant had judgment, from which plaintiff has appealed. On said trial plaintiff read as evidence those
parts of the answer of the original defendants admitting the exetion of the note, the note itself, a. deed conveying the property in
question to Robert as trustee for the separate use, &c., of Harriet
Smith, and proved that she had no other-estate, and that there
had been no administration of her estate. No objection was made
to the admission of any of the evidence; and the judgment must
have been based upon the conclusion that the Circuit Court had
no jurisdiction of the cause, Mrs. Smith having died while it was
pending. In other words, the argument made here must have
prevailed in the Circuit Court, that after the death of Mrs. Smith
the plaintiff had a legal demand which he could have presented
for allowance in the Probate Court, or that the administrator of
her estate, instead of the heirs, was the proper party, even if the
Circuit Court could retain, because it had once.acquired, jurisdiction. The question is therefore presented whether the plaintiff
had a claim against Mrs. Smith or her property of which the Probate Court had jurisdiction. As to the precise nature of the obligation of a feme covert who had a separate estate when it was
incurred, the authorities are not agreed, but are in inextricable
confusion. It is well settled in this state that if she execute a
note, .nd nothing to the contrary is expressed, the creditor may,
by a proceeding in-equity, have it satisfied out of her separate
property: Whitesides v. Cannon, 23 Mo. 457. But it is not a lien,
or, strictly speaking, a charge upon the property, nor does it bind
her personally. All that can be said of it is that it is an anomalous obligation, neither binding her nor her estate, general or separate, but only constituting a foundation for a proceeding in equity,
by which her separate property may be subjected to its payment;
and, until a decree to that effect is rendered, it is neither a lien
nor a charge upon that estate. If she owns, in addition to her
separat6 property, other property in which she has no separate
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estate, even where a court of equity enforces payment of the obligation out of the separate estate, it will not, for any deficiencies
of the separate estate, allow a resort to her other property; but
the proposition urged here is that, after her death, that becomes
a personal obligation which, when entered into, was no obligation
at all. Except with respect to her separate property, the obligation was a nullity both at law and in equity; and at law, even the
ownership by her of a separate property gave it no validity whatever. At law, she is, during her coverture, generally incapable
of entering into any valid contract to bind either her person or
her estate. In equity, also, it is now clearly established that she
cannot by contract bind her person or her property generally.
The only remedy allowed will be against her separate property.
The reason of this distinction between her separate property and
her other property is that, as to the former, she is treated as a
feme sole, having the general power of disposing of it; but as to
the latter, all the legal disabilities of a feme covert attach upon
her: Story's Eq., sect. 1397.
In ,S'ocekett v. Ray, 4 Bro. 0. 0. 485, the Master of the Rolls
said: "It is argued that, supposing her a feme sole, she could do
the act; there the single woman can act, because she can bind herself personally; but is there any contract that this married woman
could enter into that would bind her after the termination of the
coverture ? If she gave a bond, could she be sued upon it after
the coverture? Certainly not. A man or a single woman, as
they can bind themselves personally, may bind their executors and
administrators; but it is not so of a married woman." In Aylett
v. Ashton, 1 Myl. & C. 105, which was a suit to compel the
specific performance of an agreement made by a married woman
with respect to her separate estate, Lord CoTTENHAM, referring to
.Praneisv. Nozzell, 1 Mod. 258, said: "It was there decided, and
clearly in conformity with all previous decisions, that the court has
no power against a feme covert in personam, but that if she has
separate property the court has control over that separate property.
In all cases,,however, the court must proceed in rem against the
property. A feme covert is not competent to enter into contracts
so as to give a personal remedy against her. Although she may
become entitled to property for her separate use, she is no more
capable of contracting than before; a personal contract would be
within the incapacity under which a feme covert labors."
VOL. XX.-21
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If tne contract of a married woman could, with respect to hei.
personal 'property, be treated as a personal obligation even in
equity, we see no reason why it could not be specifically enforced
to the extent of that property; and that it was refused by Lord
COTTENRAM in Aylett v. Ashton, supra, conclusively shows that
it was not regarded by him as a personal obligation in any sense
whatever. In Parker, .RE'r, v. Lambert's Adm'rs, 31 Ala. 89,
it was held that "a married woman, owning a separate estate by
deed, living apart from her husband by agreement with him, could
not at common law make any contract upon which either she or
her personal representatives could be sued at law." The contrary
was held by this court in King v. 11ittalberger,50 Mo. 184, but
no authority was cited in support of the decision there announced,
and the argument is far from satisfactory. This case was followed
by the Court of Appeals in Horton v. Ransom, 6 Mo. App. 19,
and Staley v. Hfowa'd, 7 Id. 280; but as .inq v. Mittalberger
is in conflict with the general current of authority, both in the
United States and in England, and with the principle upon which
the separate property of a feme covert is charged in equity, we are
constrained to recede from the doctrine therein announced, and to
bring this court in harmony with the better considered adjudical.
tions elsewhere.
It follows from the foregoing premises, that when Mrs. Smith.
died the note in suit was not a debt against her for which her personal representative could be sued, and it could not be allowed in
the Probate Court against the general assets of her estate in course
of administration.
It is no demand against her general estate. It could not be
allowed as such. It was not a lien upon her separate estate. The
right of the plaintiff to satisfaction out of her separate property
is a creation of equity, iecognisable nowhere else, and enforceable
nowhere else. The Probate Court could in no manner adjudicate
the demand, not because it has not jurisdiction of equitable as
well as legal demands against the estate, but by reason of the
special provisions regulating the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred upon that court.
All demands are to be classed in first, second, third, fourth,
fifth or sixth class, and to be paid in proportion to their amounts,
and no demand of any class can be paid until all previous classes
are satisfied. One holding the obligation of a feme covert would,
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have no right to any other property of her estate, and if his
demand were placed in either of the classes, he might, if the provisions of the statute were strictly observed, get satisfaction of his
demand out of the general property, to the exclusion of other
creditors who, as to that property, have a preference over him.
Specific provisions are made for those cases in which demands are
liens upon any of the property of the testator, or intestate, and
none of these provisions applic to the plaintiff's claim, for he has
no lien. He has no demand against the estate for which he could
sue Mrs. Smith's executor or administrator, and has no remedy
except that to which he has resorted. Thus far we encounter no
difficulty; but here one occurs which should be met by an amendment of the administration law, inasmuch as in this progressive
age it is not unusual for married women to execute promissory.
notes and incur other pecuniary obligations, and to hold property
for their sole and separate use.
When afeme covert dies, her separate property ceases to be such,
and stands upon the same footing as any other she may have
owned. While her death does not extinguish the right of one to
- satisfaction -of an obligation incurred by her while a fene covert,
'out of what was her separate property, he has no right to satisfaction out of any other of her property, which is subject to the debts
of her general creditors if she has any, and she may have such,
while they, equally with the special creditors, have a right to
resort to whatever was her separate property for payment of their
demands. If, then, the court should find for plaintiff, what judgment shall it render? If it decree the sale of this property for
payment of plaintiff's demand, and it should thereby be paid, and
there should be other creditors, either general or special, he would
obtain a preference to which he is not entitled over either class.
Nor can the courts determine in this cause whether there are or
not other creditors; for unless parties to the proceedings, if there
were any. they would not be bound by such adjudication. It has
been ascertained in this case that Mrs. Smith was possessed of no
other property; but it has not been, nor could it in this proceeding be, conclusively ascertained that she owed no other debts. The
Circuit Court cannot bring other- creditors in and take charge of
the administration of the estate by allowing demands against it,
and making final distribution. That jurisdiction has been confided to the Probate qourt: Titterington v. Hooke., 58 Mo. 593.
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That there is here probably but one creditor, and only this specific
property, cannot chainge the principle or warrant an assumption
by the Circuit Court of probate jurisdiction. Therefore, all that
this court can do, if it finds for the plaintiff, is to enter a decree
charging this property with plaintiff's demand-with directions to
the Probate Court of the proper county, where letters of administration on the estate shall have been granted, to have the demand
paid out of the property, if no other creditors of the estate appear
within the time allowed by the administration law. If other
creditors appear, and have claims allowed, then this demand of
plaintiff shall be placed in the class to which it would be entitled
under the administration law if it were an ordinary demand against
the estate. Thefe being no other property, it stands upon the
same footing as other unpreferred demands against the estate.
This would not be proper if there were other property and general
creditors of the estate. In such case, the directions should be such
that the preference of the general creditors in the assets, other
than what was her 'separate property, should be preserved, and
any preference of the special creditor in the latter should be prevented. If the other general assets should be exhausted, and leave
the general creditors unpaid, in whole or in part, they would have
an equal right to the payment of their unpaid balance out of such
other estate with the special creditor for the amount of his claim.
That is his demand, and the respective balances due them would
be paid in proportion to the amount then due and unpaid to said
special and general creditors respectively. With respect to the
pleadings, plaintiff, under sect. 5, Wagner's Statutes, p. 1050, must
prove all material allegations put in issue by the answer of the
guardian ad litem. The pleading of'Mrs. Smith .is to be taken
as that of her representative, unless the latter see proper to file
amended pleadings. Here the guardian, for his ward, filed an
answer denying all the allegations of the petition, and thereby put
plaintiff to proof of the same, as if there had been no answer filed
by Mrs. Smith. If objection had been made, it would have been
error to allow plaintiff to read portions of Mrs. Smith's answer as
evidence, or to read the note without proof of its execution. Mrs.
Smith's answer, without an affidavit denying the execution of the
note, was not sufficient to put plaintiff to proof of its execution;
but the heirs are not presumed to know whether their ancestor did
or did not execute it, and therefore could not be required to make
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such an affidavit in order to impose on the plaintiff the burden of
proving its execution.
Judgment reversed, and cause remanded.
SHERWOOD, 0.

J., and

NORTON,

The principal case brings up the subject of a married woman's liability upon
her contracts. It goes without the saying that the subject is one of general
importance. Not only that, but in respect to certain questions pertaining to
it great interest attaches by virtue of
the diversity of opinion which prevails
in our judicial tribunals.
Of course at common law a .reme
covert was not competent to enter into
contracts, and no action against her
could be maintained thereon.
That
point was conclusively settled by the
great case of Marshall v. Button, 8
Term 547. That case, decided in
1800, was twice argued, and the opinion was by Lord Chief Justice KL"roK.
The point at issue was whether, by any
agreement between a man and his wife,
she might be made legally responsible
for the contracts she entered into, and
be liable to the actions of those who
trusted to her engagements as if she
were sole and unmarried.
The wife
lived apart from her husband, and had
a separate estate secured by deed. The
conclusion was that she could not be
held liable. The general principle that
a fene covert could not, at common law,
be holden on her contracts is so familiar
and so well settled that any citation of
.authorities would be superfluous. It is
to be noticed, however, that her contract was not merely voidable, but was
absolutely void, so that it was not subject to ratification upon her becoming
discovert: 2 Black. Com. 293; Robinson
v. Robinson, 11 Bush (Ky.) 174 (1874);
Quinn's Appeal, 86 Penna. St. 447, 453
(1878) ; Glidden v. Strupler, 52 Id.
400 (1866); Wooden v. Wampler, 69
Ind. 90 (1879). A married woman had
no power to contract, because her will

J., dissenting.

was supposed to be no longer free, but
subject to the constraint of her husband.
Marriage placed her sub potestate vri,
and her power to contract was therefore suspended. Moreover, there was
no fund out of which her liabilities could
be satisfied, as all her personalty became
vested in the husband, and he was entitled to the rentA and profits of her
realty, and had an estate by the .curtesy
in her lands after her death. No matter
what her representations might have
been, she was never estopped from setting up her coverture as a defence in an
action sounding in contract: Oglesby
Coal Co. v. Pasco, 79 Ill. 164 (1875).
And see Bigelow on Estoppel 490. Bu't
the defence of coverture was always
personal: 1Ricketson v. Giles, 91 Ill. 154
(1878). Moreover, her incapacity to
contract a personal obligation could not
be overcome by any form of acknowledgment or mode of execution, or by
uniting with her husband in the contract. See Bank v. Partee, 99 U. S.
325, 330 (1880).
Nevertheless, there were special cases
in which this disability did not exist,
she being compelled from necessity to
act as a ferne sole, as when her husband
was imprisoned for life, or for years, or
had been exiled, or had fled the country.
The feme was then considered in a state
of widowhood, and her husband as being
civilly dead and her disability as at an
end: Co. Lit. 132, a; Walford v. Duchess de Pienne, 2 Esp. 554 (1785);
Aewsorne v. Bowyer, 3 P. Wms 37
(1729) ; Bank v. Partee, supra; lhea
v. Rthenner, 1 Peters 105 (1828). And
the right of a married woman to contract after she has been abandoned by
her liusband has been held in a number
of cases in this country: GregoryV. Paul,
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15 Mass. 31 (1818) ; Gregory v. Pierce,
4 Met. 478 (1842) ; Love v. loynehan,
16 Ill. 277 (1854) ; Prescott v. isher,
22 Id. 390 (1859); Anderson v. Jacobson, 66 Id. 524 (1873) ; Bean v. Moran, 4 McCord (S. C.) 148 (1827);
Hannon v. M1adden, 10 Bush (Ky.) 666
(1874) ; Carothers v. k)cIese, 43 Tex.
221, 224 (1875) ; Zimple.ian v. Robb,
53 Id. 280 (1880).
This right is secured "hy statute in
some of the states, as in :Pennsylvania.
In that state it is held not to be necessary that there should be a formal decree of court that a wife is to be regarded
as afrne sole trader to enable her to contract. Tne right is said to result from
proof that she has been thrown upon her
own resources for support, and that
her husband has desertea. her or has
neglected to provide for her: Conley v.
Bentley, 87 Penna. St. 40, 48 (1878) ;
Black v. Tricker, 59 Id. 13 (1868). In
Kentucky, where the statute provides
that she may be empowered by decree
of court to act as a feme sole under certain circumstances, the statute is held
to be a substitute for the common law:
Tannon v. Madden, supra.
There exists, then, a distinction betaveen desertions and separations. When
there is an absolute desertion, and the
wife is abandoned and left to her own
resources, she is held to have the right
to contract as a feme sole. But when
there is a separation by agreement, and
the wife has a separate estate secured to
her by deed, then as was held in Narshall v. Putton, sutpra, she has no right
to contract. That case has never been
overruled in England, and has been
recognised in this country as laying
down the true principle. See Park7er's
Bx'r v. Lambert's Admr's, 31 Ala. 89
(1857) ; Beach v. Beach, 2 Hill (N. Y.)
260 (1842); Ayer v. Warren, 47 M e.
217 (1859).
It is possible that there
may be cases of separation by agree,ment, with separate estatc by deed, in
which a married woman has the right to

contract. Such aright has been claimed to exist notwithstanding Marshall v.
Putton. For instance, Mr. Dane, in his
Abr., pp. 335, 339, says: "Now,
upon close examination, it will be found
that in Putton'scase, and in every case
in which the decision has been against
this separate liability of the wife, there
has existed one or both of these defects
in the articles of separation. Either
her separate maintenance has been
clearly inadequate, and a mere fraud
upon her, or not effectually, or not permanently secured to her, or her husband
has rotained some right at some time to
seize her person, or to claim it with her
society, and of course her services. In
either case the reason of her liability
fails." Again, he says, " On examining the cases carefully, it will be found she
cannot be sued, though living separate,
when her husband has not renounced his
right to her person. And that she may
be sued alone when be has renounced
this right, and she may bind herself, so
as to be sued alone on her contracts,
whenever his marital rights are not
affected by them, and there is no coercion." And in Ayer v. Warren, 47
Me. 217, 228 (1859), TEnxNv, 0. J.,
concedes this distinction to be well taken,
and expresses it as his opinion that no
English case can be found denying to the
wife the power to bind herself by contract when an effectual renunciation of
marital rights is shown.
The statutes which have been passed
in most, if not in all, of the states,
creating what is known as a married
woman's statutory separate estate, have
generally been construed as conferring
upon her a right to contract, but only in
reference to such estates, the right being
limited and not general : West v. Caraway, 28 Mich. 464 (1874); Jenne v.
Marble, 37 Id. 319 (1877); Stillwell v..
Adams, 29 Ark. 346 (1874); Henry
v. Blackcburn, 32 Id. 445 (1877); Alexander v. Bonton, 55 Cal. 15 (1880);
Thomas v. Passage,54 Ind. 106 (1876);
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Pippen v. Wesson, 74 N. C. 444 (1876);
Rhodes v. Gibbs, 39 Texas 432 (1873);
Jone v. Crosthwaitc, 17 Iowa 393
(1864); Wliitworth v. Carter, 43 Miss.
61 (1870); Carpenter v. Mitchell, 50
Il1. 470 (1869); Cookson v. Toole, 59
Id. 520 (1871); Armstrong V. Ross,
20 N. J. Eq. 117 (1869); Hayward v.
Barker, 52 Vt. 429 (1880).
So strictly was this power construed
in Pennsylvania, that in an action
against a married woman on a note
given for money borrowed for the
avowed purpose of improving her separate real estate, it was held that she was
not liable unless it was shown that the
money was actually applied to that
ohject- Hleugh v. .Jones, 32 'Penn. St.
432 (1859).
See also Shannonv. Shultz,
87 Id. 484 (1878); S&hriffer v. Sanm,
81 Id. 385 (1876).
And in a recent
case in the same court, it was held that
she could only charge her separate estate
by contract where the contract was for
necessary improvements and repairs, and
that the necessity must be affirmatively
shown : Kuhns v. Turney, 87 Penn. St.
497, 501 (1878).
But in New York,
in a late case, it was held that if the
money was loaned in reliance upon her
representations that it was to be applied
for the benefit of her separate estate, it
was immaterial that the money was not
in fact so applied: MlkVey v. Cantrell,
70 N. Y. 295 (1877).
A question has
been raised as to the power of a married
woman to bind herself under these
statutes for the purchase of real estate.
In some cases it has been held that she
cannot bind herself by such an agreement: Robinson v. Robinson, 11 Bush
(Ky.) 174 (1874); Carpenterv. Mitchell,
50 II. 471 (1869).
In ,Ilarbergerv.
Spohn, 9 Phil. 612, the ruling was that
she could not buy real estate on credit,
she having no separate property. On
the other hand, it has been held that she
may buy real estate on credit, and that
it is immaterial whether she has a separate estate or not: Caslmzan v. Henry, 75

N. Y. 103 (1878); Dayton v. Walsh,

47 Wis. 113, 119, 120 (1879). See
Huyler's Ex'rs v. Atwood, 26 N. J. Eq.
504; s. c., 28 Id. 275.
Her right to become a surety has been
denied in some of the states and conceded in others. It is denied in the following cases: Russell v. Peoples' Savings Bank, 39 Mich. 671 (1878) ; Jenne
v. 3farble, 37 Id. 319 (1877) ; DeVries V. Conklin, 22 Id. 255 (1871);
Hyner v. Dickinson, 32 Ark. 780 (1878);
Smith v. Williams, 43 Conn. 409, 418
(1876) ; IVolff v. Van M]fetre, 19 Iowa
134 (1865) ; Van M3etre v. Wolf, 27
Id. 341 (1869) ; Veal v. Hurt, 63 Ga.
730 (1879) ; Saulsbury v. Weaver, 59
Id. 254 (1877) ; Kohn v. Russell, 91
Ill. 138 (1878) ; Doyle Y. Kelly, 75 Id.
574 (1874) ; Athol 3achine Co. v. Fuller, 107 Mass. 437 (1871) ; Willianis v.
Hayward, 117 Id. 532 (1875). In
Louisiana, a married woman is prohibited from becoming a surety for her
husband, or binding her properiy for his
debts: Claverie v. Gerodias, 30 La.
Ann. 291 (1878). In New Jersey, a
married woman cannot bind her separate
estate except by a mortgage acknowledged as required by law, or for debts
contracted for the benefit of her separate
estate, or for her own benefit on the
credit of it: Perkins v. Elliott, 22 N. J.
Eq. 128 (1871). An accommodation
note is not binding : Peake v. LeBaw,
21 Id. 269 (1871). And in Texas, a
married woman is not liable on her note
unless it was given for her separate property: Wallace v. Finbery, 46 Tex. 35
(1876) ; Snow Yv. Mllather, 52 Id. 650
(1880). In the following cases it has
been held that she may bind herself as
surety: Williams v. Urinston, 35 Ohio
St. 304 (1880); Mlayo v. Hutchinson,
57 Me. 546 (1870) ; Jarman v. Wilkerson, 7 B. Mon. 293 (1847) ; Burnett v.
Hawpe, 25 Gratt. 481 (1874). The
principal case shows such contract would
be binding in Missouri. It would also
be binding in Minnesota, Colorado,
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Wisconsin, in Illinois since 1874, and
in Massachusetts since 1874. See Northwestern Mutual Ljfe Ins. Co. v. Allis,
23 Minn. 337 (1877); Wells v. Caywood, 3 Col. 493 (1877) ; Beard v. Dedoiph, 29 Wis. 136 t1871) ; Taylor v.
Boardman, 92 Il. 568 (1379) ; Major
v. Holmes, 124 Mass. 108 (1878).
1er right to mortgage her lands to
secure a debt of her husband, has been
generally conceded : Ferdon v. Miller,
34 N. J. Eq. 10 (1881) ; Mebane v.
AMIehane, 80 N. 0. 34 ; O'Harav. Baum,
88 Penn. St. 114 (1878) ; Riwdes v.
Gibbs, 39 Tex. 432 (1873); Layman v.
Schultz, 60 Ind. 547" (1878) : Kerchner
v. Kempton, 47 Md. 568; 3lalloy v.
Clapp, 2 Lea (Tenn.) 586 (1879);
Hobson v. Hobson, 8 Bush (Ky.) 666
(1871) ; Patton v. Kinsnm, 17 Iowa
428 (1864) ; Smith v. Osbor, 33 Mich.
410 (1876), Scott v. Ward, 35 Ark.
480 (1880).
Itisprohibitedin Georgia:
Dunbar v. Mlize, 53 Ga. 435 (1874).
Also in' Alabama: Bibb v. Pope, 43
Ala. 190 (1869) ; litchell v. Lippincott,
2 Wood 467 (1874).
In Illinois, she
cannot mortgage her realty to secure a
pre-existing debt of her husband : Wilheln v. Schmidt, 84 Ill. 183 (1876).
In consequence of the common-law
principles, already noticed, vesting a
married woman's property in her husband, the practice grew up of vesting
the legal title in a trustee, so that her
propefty might be enjoyed by her, free
from all control of her husband. In
equity she became entitled to the beneficial interest in property so vested, and
could control it by sale or otherwise.
In Peacock v. M3onk, 2 Vesey 190 (1750),
it was settled that a feme covert acting
with respect to her separate property was
in equity competent to act in all respects
as if she was a feme sole. The next
question was whether her general personal engagements bound her separate
estate, she not having made them a direct
charge upon the estate. Tlds question
was settled in England in the famous

case of

ulne v. Tenant, I Bro. C. C.

16 (1778) ; s. c. 2 Dick. 560, Reg. Lib.

1778. The conclusion reached was that
such engagements did bind the estate.
And it was afterwards determined that
these engagements need not be in writing.
See Murray v. Barlee, 3 Myl. & K. 209
(1834); 3latthewman's Case, L. R1.,
3 Eq. 787 (1866).
The question of whether a feme covert
cestul que trust could dispose of her beneficial interest in the trust property in all
cases where she was not in terms restrained from doing so, by the instrument
creating the trust, has been the subject
of much discussion. It has been contended on the one hand that when the
instrument of trust declared a particular
mode in which she might dispose of the
estate her power was limited to that
mode in exclusion of any and all others.
That instead of the wife's being a feme
sole, to all intents and purposes, as to
her separate property, she was only to
be deemed a feme sole, sub modo, or to
the extent of the power clearly given by
the settlement. On the other hand, it
has been contended that, unless expressly
restrained in the instrument of trust, she
has full power to dispose of the estate,
and that the setting forth a particular
mode of disposition did not necessarily
restrict her to that mode in exclusion of
others. This last is known as the English rule. The cases by which this rule
became established in England are collected and ably reviewed by Mr. Justice
BnEEsE in his separate opinion in Suift
v. Castle, 23 111. 209 (1859). His conclusion was that there were only two or
three well considered English cases interrupting the current of decisions in that
country, in favor of the rule, from the
time of Lord McALESFIELD in 1740.
This rule was opposed by the decisions
of Sir P rEnPP
Awi)nDE and Lord LOUGHBOtOUGIt in Sockett v. W-ray, 4 Bro. C.
C. 485 (1793), in W'histler v. A'cwman,
4 Vesey 129 (1798), and in Mores v.
finish, 5 Id. 692 (1800).
But these
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cases were not followed by any of their
successors, neither by HAmnWiCxE, TAL"1Sir PEPARDEN cast into it (the current of

nOT, THURLOW or ELDON.

rE

decisions) one small pebble, followed by
Lord LoUG1nOIZOUGI with two of larger

size, but they failed to impede its force."
The English rule has been recognised
in many of the states.
ARAtwSAS: See Collins v. Wassell,
34 Ark. 17, 34 (1879).
CALIFORNIA: See Selover v. Am.
Russ. Com. Co., 7 Cal. 266, 274 (1857) ;
Racouillat v. Sansevain, 32 Cal. 376,

384 (1867).
CONNEOTICUT: See Tmlay v. Huntington, 20 Conn. 146 (1849).
IENTUOKY: See Bell v. Kellar, 13
B. Monr. 381 (18.M2) ; Kelly v. Kdly,
5 Id. 369 (1845) ; Jarman v. Wilkerson,
7 Id. 293 (1847).
MIsSOURI: See Whitesides v. Cannon,

23 M . 457 (1856) ;Kimmv. Weippert,
46 Id. 532, 536 (1870).
NEW JERSEY : See Leaycraft v. Hadden, 3 Green Ch. 512 (1845); Perkins
v. Elliott, 23 N. J. Eq. 526, 531 (1872).
NEW Yonrt: See .Jaques v. Methodist
Epis. Church, 17 Johns. 5-48 (1820);
Dyett v. N. A. Coal Co., 20 Wend. 570,
573 (1838); Albany Ins. Co. v. Bay,
4 N. Y. 9 (1850); Waxdham v. The
Society, 12 Id. 415 (1855).
VERMIONT: See Frary v.

Booth, 37

Vt. 78, 86 (1864) ; Dale v. Robinson,
51 Vt. 20, 26 (1878).
VIRGINIA: See Frank v. Lilienfeld,
33 Gratt. 377, 395 (1880), and cases
there cited.
WEST VIRGINIA:

See Radford v.
Carwile, 13 W. Va. 572 (1878); Weinberg v. Rempe, 15 Id. 831 (1879).
WiscoNsIx:

See Todd v.

Lee, 15

Wis. 365.
On the other hand, it has been held
that the contrary doctrine is the more
correct, and that she can only dispose
of the estate in the mode pointed out in
the declaration of trust.
VOL. =-" .- 22

GiEonGIA: See Weeks v. Sego, 9 Ga.
199, 203 (1850).
ILLINOIS: See Swuft v. Castle, 23
Iln. 209 (1859) ; Conkling v. Doul, 67
Id. 355 (1873).
MARYLAND : See Tarr v. Williams,
4 Md. Ch. 68 (1853); Williams v.
Donaldson, 4 Id. 414 (1849) ; Miller v.
Williamson, 5 Md. 219 (1853) ; Cooke
v. Husbands, 11 Id. 492, 503 (1858).
Mississippi: See Doty v. Mitchell,
9 S. & M. 435, 447 (1848) ; Montgomery v. Agricultural Bank, 10 Id.
567, 576 (1848).
NORTH CAROLINA: See Hardy v.
Holly, 84 N. C. 667 (1881) ; overruling
Frazier v. Brownlow, 3 Ired. Eq. 237
(1844), and Barris v. Harris, 7 Id.
ill (1850).
PENNSYLVANIA: See Maurer'sAppeal,
86 Penn. St. 384 (1878) ; Lancasterv.
Dolan, 1 Rawle 231, 248 (1829);
Lyne's Ex'r. v. Crouse, 1 Penn. St.
111 (1845) ; Rogers v. Smith, 4 Id. 93,
98 (1846).
RHODE ISLAND: See Metcalf v. Cook,
But see Eliott v.
2 R. I. 355 (1852).
Gower, 12 Id. 80, 81 (1880).
SOUTH CAROLINA: See Ewing V.
Smith, 3 Dess. 417 (1811) ; Maywood
v. Johnston, I Hill Ch. 228, 230 (1833) ;
Robinson v. Executors of Dart, Dud. Eq.
128, 131 (1838) ; Clark v. Makenna,
Cheeve's Eq. 163 (1840) ; Reid v. Lamar, 1 Strob. Eq. 27, 37 (1845).
TENNESSEE: See Morgan v. Elam,
12 Tenn. 375 (1833) ; Marshall v.
Stephens, 27 Id. 159 (1847) ; Ware v.
Sharp, 31 Id. 489 (1852); Kirby v.
Miller, 44 Id. 4 (1867).
But the principle that the general engagements of a married woman could be
enforced in equity against her separate
estate, although not made a specific
charge upon it by her-a principle
settled in England, as we have seen in
Hulme v. Tenant-hasnot been favorably
received, in the American courts. It
has been held in the following cases that
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283 (1857); 71ells v. Thorman, 37
Conn. 318 (1870); Henry v. Blackburn,
has expressly charged her estate with 32 Ark. 450 (1877); Dobbin v. Bubbard, 17 Id.. 194 (1856) ; Pentz v.
them: Kirby v. Miller, 44 Tenn. 4
(1867) ; Dale v. Robinson, 51 Vt. 20,
Simonson, 13 N. J. Ch. 232 (1861);
27 (1878); Willard v. Eastham, 15 Homwoathlc Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Gray 328 (1860) ; Williams v. Hugunin, MAfarshall, 32 N. J. Eq. 103, 112 (1880);
69 Ill. 214 (1873) ; Furness v. McGov- Shacklett v. Polk, 3 Heisk. 122 (871);
Williams v. Iing, 43 Conn. 569 (1876);
ern, 78 Id. 338 (1875) ; Yale v.Dederer,
ZIc Vey v. Cantrell, 70 N. Y. 295
18 -N. Y. 265 (1859) ;.s. c. 22 N. Y.
(1877).
450 (1860) ; Knox v. Jordan, 5 Jones
As is stated in the principal case, a
Eq. 175 (1859) ; Pippen v. Vesson, 74
N. C. 442 (1876) ; Wilson v. Jones, 46 feme covert's liability was never personal: Frank v. Lilienfeld, 33 Gratt.
U',d. 357 (1876) ; Athol 1M1achine Co. v.
377, 397 (1880) ; Henry v. Blackburn,
9uller, 107 MNass. 437 (1871) ; Woffv.
;'an.3Metre, 19 Iowa 134 (1865) ; Eisen- supra; Terry Y. Hammonds, 47 Cal. 32
(1873).
And a judgment against her
ord v. Snyder, 71 N. Y. 45 (1877).
In opposition to the above cases, it
was void, even when rendered upon
has been held that the intent to charge
confession: Quinn's Appeal, 86 Penn.
her separate estate will be inferred from
St. 447, 453 (1878); Morse v. Tappan,
3 Gray 411 (1855) ; Norton v. Mleader,
the mere execution of a note: Burnett v.
Hawpe, 25 Gratt. 481 (1874) ; Darnall 4 Sawyer 620, 624 (1866) ; Grifffth v.
v. Smith, 26 Id. 878 (1875) ; Garland Clarke, 18 'Md. 457 (1862); Bank v.
And in
v. Pamphin, 32 Id. 305 (1879) ; Williams Partee, 99 U. S. 325 (1878).
Weil v. Simmons, 66 Mo. 617 (1877),
v. Urmston, 35 Ohio St. .304 (1880)
it was held to make no difference that
Burnley v. Thomas, 632Mo. 390 (1876);
she wag sued as a member of a merMetropolitan Bank v. Taylor, 62 Mo.
cantile firm. But when the law confers
338 (1876) ; Deering v. Boyle, 8 Kans.
530 (1871) ; .farman v. Wilkerson, 7 B. upon her capacity to contract in certain
Mon. 293 (1847) ; Whitsides v. Can- cases, it clothes her, as a logical consequence, with whatever capacity is necesnon, 23 Mo. 457 (1856).
sary to give a full remedy to the party
The courts in New Yock have gone
further than the courts of other states with whom she contracts. In such cases,
she has the persona standi in judicis, and
in holding that the intent must be
a judgment confessed by her would be
declared in the very contract which is
binding: Swayne v. Lyon, 67 Penn. St.
the foundation of the charge: Yale v.
436 (1871) ; Vlan Metre v. Wolf, 27
Dederer,supra; Corn Exchange Ins. Co. v.
Iowa 341 (1869).
Babcock, 42 N. Y. (App'x) 613 (1870);
And as is also stated in the principal
.Eisenlord v. Snyder, 71 Id. 45 (1877).
case, her liability is not a lien upon the
See Treadwell v. Archer, 76 Id. 196
separate estate until made so by decree:
(1879).
Armstronq v. Ross, 20 N. J. Eq. 119
When the liability was incurred for
(1869);
rank v. Lilien/eld, 33 Gratt.
the benefit of her separate estate, it is
377, 397 (1880).
not necessary that she should have speEquity did not decree that satisfaction
cifically charged her estate with it. It
should be had out of the corpus of the
will be enforced in equity, and she will
be presumed to have intended that the real estate, but only out of the personalty
separate estate should 1he charged with and cut of the rents and profits of the
realty: Weinberg v. Rempe, 15 W. Va.
it: Withers v. Sparrow, 66 N. C. 129
831, 860 (1879); Radford v. Carwile,
(1872) ; Caldwell v Sawyer, 30 Ala.

her general liabilities cannot be satisfied

out of the separate estate, unless she
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13 Id. 572 (1878); Cox v. Wood, 20
Paliaer v. Rankins,
Ind. 54 (1863);
30 Ark. 771 (1875); Henryv. Blackburn, 32 Id. 452 (1877); Lewis v. Yale,
4 Fla. 418, 424 (1852); Frankv. Lilien33
Gratt. 377, 395 (1880);
fid,
Ibune v. Tenant, I Bro. C. C. 20
But it seems that the real estate
(1778).
may be sold if necessary to discharge
the obligation: Wiitesides v. Cannon,
23 Mo. 457 (1856); Tiernaan v. Poor,
1 G. & J. (Md.) 217 (1829); Yale v.
Dederer, 21 Barb. 290 (1855); Dale v.
Robinson, 51 Vt. 20 (1878).
Upon the death of a feme covert having a separate estate not disposed of by
her will, the personalty goes to the husband as her administrator: Proudley v.
Fielder, 2 MIy. & K. 57 (1833); M1olony
v. Kennedy, 10 Sim. 254 (1839); Johnstone v. Lumb, 15 Id. 308 (1846);
M1usters v. W~right, 2 De G. & Sm. 777
But undisposed of real estate
(1848).
goes to the heir, subject to the husband's
right as tenant by the curtesy: Roberts
v. Dixwell, 1 Atk. 607 (1738); Pitt v.
Jackson, 2 Bro. C. 0. 51 (1786); Pol-

left v. Tyrer, 14 Sim. 125 (1844);
Harris v. Alott, 14 Bear. 169 (1851);
Appleton v. Rowley, L. R., 8 Eq. 139
(1869); Dale v. Robinson, 51 Vt. 20,
26, 31 (1878).
The conclusion of the court in the
principal case is that the general creditors
are to be paid out of the assets of the
general estate, to the exclusion of tile
special creditor. No question can be
raised as to the correctness of this conclusion. But when the court goes on to
say that if the assets of the general estate
are insufficient to satisfy such creditor,
he may come in and share pro rata in the
separate estate with the special creditor,
there may be reason for asking why the
equity should not be recognised to its
full extent, and the general creditor be
postponed to the special creditor, and
only allowed to share in whatever
remains of the separate estate after the
special creditor has been paid. Otherwise, the general creditor gains an undue
advantage, and the special creditor loses
a corresponding advantage, by reason
of the death of the feme covert.
HENRY WADE ROGERS.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
A. H. VANHORN v. JOHN GILBOUGH

ET AL.

A general custom that a broker may pledge his customer's stock for the purpose
of raising money to carry it, is valid.
When the market value of stock so pledged falls below a price that will reimburse the broker for all expenses, a custom of brokers to sell out the customer's
stock without notice, and hold the latter liable for the loss, is valid.
Aside from any usage, the admission of the customer that he never intended to
pay for, and take up the stock, estops him from complaining of want of notice, or
informality in the giving of notice.

ERROR to the Common Pleas of Luzerne county.

Assumpsit by Gilbough, Bond & Co. against A. H. Van Horn.
The cause was referred to Hon. Henry M. Hoyt as referee,
whose finding of facts and of law was as follows:1. In May 1872, the defendant, through Thomas Wilson,

VANHORN v. GILBOUGH.

directed the plaintiffs, Gilbough, Bond & Co., a firm of brokers in
Philadelphia, to purchase for him at the market price three hundred shares of the capital stock of the Philadelphia and Reading
Railroad Company. The plaintiffs immediately made the purchase at 858- per share, that being the market price, and the stock
was delivered to them on the same day, or the day following.
The defendant paid $1500 on account, and the plaintiffs raised
the balance for defendant, by a pledge of the stock as collateral,
and they duly rendered him a statement, showing a balance against
him, 31st May 1872, of $16,254.75. That the stock would be
retained as collateral to the balance due, was understood by defendant at the time of purchase. Plaintiffs, in order longer to
carry the stock for defendant, paid the interest and the usual
broker's commissions, as cost of carrying the same, and charged
such cost against the defendant.
2. That where stock is only partially paid for by party ordering its purchase, it was and is the custom of brokers to use the
stock as collateral to raise *money to carry the same for the customer, and the custom was known to Thomas Wilson at the time
he ordered the purchase for the defendant.
8. That Whenever the market value of the stock falls below a
price that will fully reimburse the broker for all outlays and expenses, it is the custom between brokers, as well as between brokers
and their customers, to sell the latter's stock at the stock exchange
without notice, and bold the customer for the loss; this custom
being likewise known to Mr. Wilson.
4. That plaintiffs, by letter dated September 23d 1878, gave
notice to defendant to take up by twelve M. next day the stock
already pledged by them as collateral, and advise them by telegraph.
Again by letter on the 8th October they notified defendant to
pay for and take up the stock. No answer was ever sent nor any
attention paid by the defendant to either of these letters.
5. That on the 22d day of September 1873, the parties to
whom the same were pledged sold out two hundred shares of the
defendant's stock at the Stock Exchange, Philadelphia, at $48 per
share, and on the 18th of October, the remaining one hundred
shares at $504, the losg of price being borne by plaintiffs ; that
the prices received were the market prices of the stock on the
respective days of sale, and that between those dates the market
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price dropped as low as $45; that the highest price attained since
the last sale of defendant's stock was $59 per share, 27th of March
1874, and its market value at time of trial was about $15 per
share.
6. That notwithstanding the sale of the two hundred shares, the
plaintiffs, at any time up to the 18th of October (ten days after
the last notification to defendant to take up his stock), were able
and willing to deliver to defendant three hundred shares of Philadelphia and Reading stock on payment of balance due by him.
7. Notice that the stock had been sold was promptly sent to and
received by the defendant, to which he paid no attention; and
from the time of purchase, in May 1872, down to the 1st of January 1874, statements in detail of the accounts between the parties
were at regular intervals of about thirty days sent to and received
by defendant. These statements, taken together, show a purchase
of the stock and its price; the charges of interest and commission,
and $75 extra interest as cost of carrying the stock ; the credit of
dividends received; the sale of two hundred shares September 22d
1873, at $48, and one hundred shares October 18th, at $50J, and
that the balance claimed by plaintiffs the 1st of January 1874 was
$1389.41.
8. That each statement of the account received by the defendant
contained the request: "Please examine and report on this account
as soon as convenient," but down to the time of trial the defendant never objected to the account as stated, nor to the sale of stock
as made. He never demanded the stock, nor offered to pay for it
and take it up, and in fact admits, when sworn in his own behalf,
that he did not at any time intend to pay for it and take it up in
case it declined in price.
Are the plaintiffs entitled to recover on the facts as found ? The
stock having actually been bought in for the defendant, and the
certificates delivered to the plaintiffs, the transaction was legitimate
so far as they were concerned, and was not a gambling transaction,
notwithstanding the defendant on his part did not intend to pay
for and take up the tock so purchased: Smith v. Bouvier, 20 P.
F. Smith 325; Maxton v. aizeen, 25 Id. 166. Other questions,
however, are raised affecting the right of recovery.
1. Did the defendant have actual previous notice of the sales ?
Of course, the letter of 23d September was not notice of an
intended sale on the 22d, for that had already occurred, and the
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letter of the 8th October, as a mere notice of sale was defective
in not naming the time and place.
2. Are the customs noted in the second and third conclusions
of fact valid and binding upon the defendant?
They will be considered separately.
I can perceive no real objection to'the validity of a general
usage that a broker may use his customer's stock as collateral to
carry it for the customer. Such usage contravenes no statute or
principle of public policy. The customer can, of course, avoid all
trouble in this respect by paying for his stock in full; but where,
as here, he only pays a small percentage of its value, while his
agent, the broker, must provide for the balance, it would not seem
unreasonable, that the broker should for that purpose pledge it as
collateral. Knowledge of this custom on the part of Mr. Wilson,
who ordered plaintiffs to purchase the stock for defendant, is to be
imputed to the defendant himself. I, therefore, regard it as within
the known terms and scope of.the broker's agency, and that they
had authority not only to purchase the stock, but to deal with it
in the manner they did in order to carry it for the defendant.
As to the custom to sell without notice, under the circumstances
mentioned in the third finding of fact, I assume that if good against
the plaintiffs it was binding upon the defendant their principal.
I am not unmindful of the general rule of law that a sale of collateral should be upon notice of time and place of sale, but, as said
by Judge \HJITCHELL in Colket v. Ellis, 10 Phila. 375, this is a
privilege that may be waived, and the waiver be evidenced as well
by a custom known to and acquiesced in by the parties as by
express contract. The custom was known both to Mr. Wilson andthe plaintiffs. There was then at least constructive notice of sale
to them, and constructive notice to a servant is held to be notice
to his principal: Wiitesell v. Crane, 8 W. & S. 373. As between
the plaintiffs and the actual holders of the pledge, the sale was
undoubtedly sanctioned by the custom. It bound the plaintiffs
(themselves brokers) and through them, as I believe, their prin-"
cipal, this defendant; for if correct in the view already expressed
that they had authority under the circumstances to make the
pledge, the latter was subject to the incident of sale in pursuance
of the custom. I, therefore, hold both customs valid and lawful
and binding on both parties.
3. Aside from these customs, however, and even conceding that
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they do not vary the general rule already stated so as to affect the
defendant, I am of the opinion that, since the defendant by his
own admission never intended to pay for and take up the stock,
he did not act in good faith, and is estopped from complaining of
want of notice of sale or any other formality in connection with
it. The very object of notice is to enable a party to come forward,
pay up and prevent the sacrifice of the pledge, but when he says
he would not have availed himself of such notice, nor have interfered to protect the stock by paying the amount he still owed upon
it, of what advantage would it have been to him to have had notice,
or how has he been harmed by the want of it?
The stock was not sold below the market price, and under no
circumstances could it be expected to bring more if he himself was
unwilling to interfere. The result to the defendant was, therefore,
as favorable as if he had the fullest notice of the intended sale.
4. Independently of any of the foregoing considerations there
are further reasons sufficient in my judgment to entitle the plaintiffs to recover in this action.
The failure of the defendant to object to the sale, within a
reasonable time after receiviiig notice, I believe amounts to an
implied ratification: see Kelsey v. Bank of Crawford Co., 19 P.
F. Smith 426. And the statements in evidence giving an account
of sales, and particularly the balance claimed as due the plaintiffs
1st January 1874, not being objected to within a reasonable time,
constitute an account stated between the parties: Bevan v. Cullen,
7 Barr 281; Porter v. Patterson, 3 Harris 229.
What is reasonable time can only be determined upon the
special circumstances of each case, as is well illustrated in the
opinion delivered in Colket v. Ellis, already cited.
The financial panic of 1873 was almost unprecedented, and
parties were bound to act without unnecessary delay.
For nearly a month after the sale of the two hundred shares, the
plaintiffs were still in a position to furnish the defendant the whole
number of shares. The propriety and necessity of his acting with
reasonable promptness if he objected to the sale as made is obvious,
for there was still time for the plaintiffs to correct the error, if one
had been committed. From the failure of the defendant to object
to what had been done, the plaintiffs might reasonably infer that
he acquiesced, and after the lapse of years it is altogether too late
to make the objection at the trial. Treating the account rendered
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1st January 1874 as an account stated, I am of the opinion that
the plaintiffs' use party is entitled to recover the amount shown
due by said account, notwithstanding it includes a charge of $75.
extra interest, such extra interest, as well as the other charges,
being for actual disbursements on part of plaintiffs in defendant's
behalf.
Judgment should, therefore, be entered at this time against
defendant for the sum of $1759, being the amount due 1st January 1874, with interest to this date.
The defendant filed numerous exceptions to the findings of the
referee, which were dismissed by the court, and the report confirmed. "The defendant thereupon took this writ, assigning for
error the dismissal of' his exceptions.
W. L. iAfcLean, for plaintiffs in error.
George .. Bedford, for defendant in error.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SHA.SWOOD, 0. J.-Upon the facts, as found by the referee in
the court below, we think the conclusion at which he arrived was
entirely right.
Judgment affirmed.
It is proposed to consider in this
note the effect of stock-exchange usages
upon non-members of that body dealing
through its members.
The subject has claimed the attention
of the English courts in many well-considered cases during the past fifty years,
but the American authorities are few.
It had been previously decided in
Pennsylvania, in Colket v. Bllis, 10
Phila. 375, that a custom to sell stock
pledged as collateral without notice was
valid and lawful, between plaintiffs and
defendants, both members of th6 board
of brokers, and presumably having
knowledge of its usages. It was expressly stated, however, by the judge
who delivered the opinion, that he was
not to b understood as intimating what
would be the" effect if such a usage was
set up against an outside party.

The principal case, therefore, is the
first that has arisen in this state upon
the effect of such a usage upon an outsider.
The English decisions should perhaps
be first considered. It was decided by
the courts of that country, as early as
1839, that a person who employs a
broker must be supposed to give him
all authority to act as other brokers do,
and it is qAite immaterial whether or
not he himself is acquainted with the
rules by which brokers are governed:
Sutton v. Tatham, 10 Ad. & E. 27;
Mitchell v. Newhall, 15 M. & W. 308;
Bayliffev. Butterworth 17 L. J., Ex. 78.
In Bayley v. Wilkins, 18 L. J., C. P.
273,

COLTzrAN, J., remarked that he

could see no reason for doubting that a
person who goes into the stock exchange
to buy railway br other stock, must be
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taken to have a knowledge of the usual they relate to the mode of performance
course of business there. But in West- of the contract, and do not change its
ropp v. Solomon, 8 0. B. 345, a resolu- intrinsic character.
2. That thq principal cannot modify
tion of the exchange, passed after the
his own liability by private instructions
dmployment of the broker had began,
was held not binding upon the customer. to his brokers.
3. That while the principal is
bound
Coles v. Bristowe, L. R., 4 Ch. Ap.
3, went a step further, in holding that by his broker's contracts, be is not liable
no private instructions given to the for all the consequences of his insolbroker by a customer could limit the vency.
In ad-lition to the cases already cited,
general authority which, by employing
him to sell on the stock exchange he the following authorities serve to
gave him, to sell according to the usage strengthen the propositions just laid
of the exchange; and hence that the gen- down: Hodglinson v. Kelly, L. J., 37
eral custom of the exchange must fur- Ch. 837 ; Niclcalls v. Merry, L. R., 7
nish the rule by which the contract of Eng. & Irish Ap. Cases 530 ; Sheppard
the parties was to be interpreted. To v. Murphy, L. R., 2 Eq. 569 ; Bowring
the same effect is Grissell v. -Bristowe, v. Shepherd, L. R., 6 Q. B. 309 ; Lacey
L. R., 4 0. P. 36.
v. Hill Crawley's Claim, L. R., 18 Eq.
The rule was pushed still further in
182 ; Lacey v. Hill Scrimgeour's Claim,
faxted v. Paine, L. R., 6 Ex. 132, L. R., 8 Ch. 921.
where the principal was compelled to
Turning now to the American deaccept as a purchaser an entirely irre- cisions with which this note chiefly has
sponsible person, to whom objection had to do, we find Mr. Justice FOLGER, in
not been made within the time required
Walls v. Bailey, 49 N. Y. 473, making
by the rules. The doctrine was so far use of the following language: "There
modified, however, in Duncan v. kill, are cases, too, of principal and agent,
L. R.,'8 Ex. 248, as to provide that, where one has been set by another to do
while a principal who employs a broker acts in a particular business, to be done
undoubtedly authorizes the latter to bind at a particular locality, as on stok ex,
him (the principal) according to the change, where a power to deal is a
rules and usages of the stock exchange, privilege obtained by payment of a fee,
he does not enter into any obligation to and is restricted to a body which has for
be answerable for the liability which has its regulation and government come
arisen by reason of his agent's insol- under certain prescribed rules or estabvency. The recent case of Robinson v. lishe4 usages, and as the agent could not
Mollett, L. R., 7 H. L. 802, imposed a do the will of his principal, nor could
still further limitation upon the doctrine, the principal himself, save in conformity
namely, that, in order to bind an out- with those rules and usages, it is held
sider, the usage set up must be only that the principal must be bound thereby,
such an one as relates to the mode of whether cognizant of them or not, and
performing the contract, and does not thab ignorance will not excuse him."
This, however, must be regarded as
change its intrinsic character.
The following propositions seem to be the loosest sort of a dictum, in view of
other New York cases subsequently deconclusively settled in England:
1. That the usages of the stock ex- cided.
change bind the members of that body,
In Allen v. Dykers, 3 Hill 593, the
and those contracting through them, pro- offer was to prove that it was the usage
vided (a) such usages contravene no law when stock was transferred to dealers
of the land or public policy; (b) that by way of collateral security, not to
VoL. XXX.-23
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hold it specifically, but to transfer it by
hypothecation, and on tender of the
money advanced to return an equal
quantity of the same kin], also that this
usage was general and known 'to the
agent, who made the loan in question.
There was a written contract in this
case. Plaintiff borrowed $21,000 at
sixty days, offering as collateral two
hundred and fifty shares of certain stock,
with authority to sell on non-payment at
the board of brokers, " notice waived
if not paid at maturity." The usage
was held inadmissible, the court remarking that it was not necessary to determine what effect -would be due to such
proof in the case of a simple pledge as
collateral security without any further
agreement, but where, as in the present
case, the terms and conditions were
prescribed by the agreement, the parties
were bound thereby, ant proof of any
general or particular tsage must be excluded when in direct contradiction to
the fair and legal import of a written
contract.
In an action on a contact to deliver
certain railroad stock, it was held that
the plaintiff would not be permitted to
prove that by the general custom of
brokers and dealers in sto.ks in the city
of INew York, the words "dividends or
surplus dividends " in the contract, were
intended to mean dividends declared on
the stock, whether they had been announced before or after the date of the
contract, provided that on the day the
contract was made the stock was selling
in the market "dividend on " and not
I"ex-dividend ;" for the reason that effect
could not be given to the custom without
making a new agreement between the
parties: Lombardo v. Case, 45 Barb.
95.
As early as Wheeler v. Newbold, 16
n. Y. 392, it was decided that a local
custom of the city of New York to sell
stocks, &c., deposited as collateral, upon
failure of the debtor to pay the principal
debt, was unreasonable and void.

Whitehozse v. Moore, 13 Abb. Pr.
142, has sometimes been cited as establishing the contrary, but the case was
really decided upon a point of pleading.
"If," say the court in Taylor "v.
,Ketchum, 5 Rob. n. Y. 513, "the broker
desires to possess himself of the power
to sell the collateral, on failure to repay
advances, without notice of time and
place of sale, he must make an agreement that shall permit him to do so."
,,The familiar case of Jlarkham v.
Jaudon, 9 Am. Law Reg., N. S., 285
(41 IN. Y. 235), decided that the purchase of stock on margin created the
relation of pledgor and pledgee between
broker and customer. Among the offers
of testimony in that ease was one to
show a custom to sell without notice.
In passing upon this offer, the Chief
Justice observed, "The broker has no
right to sell without notice. A practice
or custom to do otherwise would have
no more force than a custom to protest
notes on the first day of grace, or a
custom of brokers not to purchase the
shares at all, but to content themselves
with a memorandum or entry in their
books of the contract made with their
customer. Such practice in each case
would be in hostility to the terms of the
contract, an attempt to change its obligation, and would be void. The proof
could not therefore he legally given."
While the New York courts have been
firm in their refusal to admit evidence
of usage to sell pledged stock without
the formalities attaching to the sale of
ordinary pledges, they have of late been
disposed to give effect to any agreements
of waiver of the right of notice: IBakr
v. Drake, 66 n. Y. 518; Wicks v.
Hatch, 62 Id. 535 ; but that in the
absence of a waiver a sale of collateral
by a broker, without notice, amounts to
a conversion has been reaffirmed in the
latest cases: Grouman v. Smith, 36
Sickels 25.
So much for the law as to the sale of
-pledges. Other usages of brokers are
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worthy of consideration. In Shaw v.
Spencer, 100 Msass. 385, the defendant
offered to show: 1. That it is a matter
of common occurrence for certificates of
stock to be issued in the name of some
other person as trustee, when in fact
there is not any trust. 2. Whether certificates of stdck issued to a designated
person as trustee are constantly bought
and sold in the stock market, by a
simple endorsement of the certificate, by
the person named as the holder, without
inquiry as to the authority by which, or
to the use or purpose for which, the
transfer was made. The former was
excluded as having no legal bearing
upon the case. As to the latter, FOSTER,
J., remarked, "the circumstance that
stock certificates issued in the name of
one as-trustee, and by him transferred in
blank, are constantly bought and sold in
the market without inquiry is likewise
unavailing. A usage to disregard one's
legal duty, to be ignorant of a rule of
law, and to act as if it did not exist,
can have no standing in the courts."
In Day v. Holmaes, 103 Mass. 306, the
auditor found that there was a general
and well-known usage among stock
brokers in Boston, in filling orders for
stock, deliverable at any time, at buyer's
option, within a certain period, with
interest at a sum not exceeding a certain
price, to buy the stock for cash, or on a
shorter time than ordered, in their own
names, not disclosing the names of their
principals, and to turn the same, as it is
called, or carry it until the maturity of
the contract, charging therefor a brokerage in addition to the usual commission
for buying, as compensation for the risk
of such carrying; that the amount of
such extra brokerage differed with the
different stocks, and with the length of
time for which they were carried; that
such usage was well known to persons
dealing in stocks of the description in
question, but that there was no evidence
of actual knowledge by the defendant of
such usage. The custom was held bad

as against sound policy and good morals.
In an action brought to recover a sum
of money alleged to be due as the first
payment or margin, on a written contract to sell stock, by a member of the
Board of Brokers, to be delivered to
the buyer in thirty days : if the contract
acknowledges the receipt of such first
payment, the plaintiff would be allowed
to give evidence of what the custom of
the Board of Brokers was with regard
to making and delivering such contracts,
for the purpose of accounting for the
delivery of the contract without receiving
the money: Winans v. Hassey, 48 Cal.
634.
In M rye v. Strouse, 5 Fed. Rep.
486, recently- decided, a custom was
pleaded that frequently a number of
telegrams would be sent to San Francisco in one dispatch. In such case the
practice was to charge each customer
having an order therein seventy-five
cents, that being the proper charge for a
single telegram of ten words, although
such customer's proportion of the actual
cost was often, if not alvays, much less.
The only evidence as to the custom was
in answer to the question whether this
was a custom among the brokers, and
was well known. The response was
given, "I tell everybody, make no
bones about it," and again, "It (the
mode of charging) is well known; we
don't make any bones about it; tell
The court said that "this
everybody."
evidence showed that there was nothing
clandestine about the charges, but does
not show a certain and uniform custom
among brokers, known to both parties.
A custom or usage like this of charging
customers, in addition to commissions,
not merely the actual cost of telegrams,
but an arbitrary sum, ordinarily much
more than the actual cost, if it can be
considered reasonable, ought to be established by very satisfactory roof, and it
should also appear that both parties had
knowledge of it."
So a usage among brokers that the
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margins put up to cover advances must
be reasonable, is bad, in the absence of
a rule being shown by which a reasonable margin can be determined : Oelricks
v. Ford,23 Howard 49.
Evans v. Waln, 21 P. F. Smith 69,
is a well known case in Pennsylvania.
The facts were substantially these:
The plaintiffs being owners of certain
shares of 0. C. and I. C. stock, employed Markoc & Brother, brokers in
)Philadelphia, to sell them. The stock
was sold by the defendants, brokers
in New York, through the agency of
one Wister, another broker in Philadelphia. Wister failed, in debt to defendants, while the proceeds of the sale
of the stock were in their hands. In
remitting the proceeds they withheld the
amount of his indebtedness. The defendants offered to prove a custom of
stockbrokers of one city, when dealing
with those of other cities: to put all the
transactions between them into one
account, and to remit or draw for the
general balance. The offer was refused
by the court below, and in passing upon
the question in the Supreme Court, Mr.
Justice WILLIAMS said, "If there is a
custom among stockbrokers, when dealing with others, to appropriate money
belonging to the principal, to the payment of his broker's indebtedness, the
sooner it is abolished the better. A
custom so iniquitous can never obtain
the force or sanction of law, and the
marvel is that it should be set up as a
defence to this action."
One more case remains to be noticed,
reported in the latest volume of the New
York reports. The plaintiff, a maiden
lady, received by mail a circular purporting to be signed by defendant as
stockbroker in New York, . setting forth
the great profits likely to ensue from
9peculating in stocks, and suggesting
several methods of so doing. A "straddle," however, was recommended as by
far the safest form of privilege, and the
circular went on to say, "when the

selection of the stock is left to us we will
guarantee that, in the stock we se'ect,
the fluctuations will aggregate at least
eight per. cent. on a sixty-day contract,
costing $400, and in case this does not
occur we will guarantee no loss, except
commissions."
Plaintiff accordingly wrote, enclosing
the necessary amount, and directed the
broker to invest in a sixty-day straddle
contract.
The broker selected Lake
Shore & M1ichigan Southern Railroad as
the stock, and so notified the plaintiff,
adding that he would exercise his best
judgment in closing at the most favorable time. On the following day, defendant (the broker) claimed that he sold one
hundred shares short against the straddle, at the same price that it was bought
for. He claimed to have done this in
accordance with a custom among brokers
to use a straddle in that way. The
court ruled that this evidence was inadmissible, on the ground that the defendant, standing in the relation he did to
the plaintiff, could not without her
knowledge or consent, under any usage
or custom not known to her, or with
respect to which she has.not contracted,
make the short sale on her account, and
thus depart from and work out a modification of the arrangement.
And in
affirming this ruling the Court of Appeals
said that the fact that contracts for the
use of a straddle in a manner different
from that contemplated" by the agreement, were more or less common, was
wholly immaterial, and a custom or usage
which binds the parties to a contract
does so only upon the principle either
that they have knowledge of its existence, or that it is so general that they
must be supposed to have contracted
with reference to it: Harris v. Turnbridge, 38 Sickels 92.
From the cases considered, which include it is believed all the American
decisions, it will be observed that our
courts have not looked with very great
favor upon the usages of stockbrokers
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and stock exchanges. Certain it is that
we have not been willing to go to the
length which the English courts have
.
done.
The conservative policy is perhaps
the better one, for as we have seen, the

English courts have of late years been
obliged, for the protection of the principal, to put some restrictions upon the
doctrines too broadly laid down in the
earlier cases.
FiUOxcIs A. LEwis, Ji.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.
O'CONNOR v. CITY OF MEMPHIS.
The doctrine formerly accepted, that upon the civil death of a corporation, its
real estate reverted to the original grantor, the debts due to and from it were extingaished and its personal property vested in the state, is no longer followed either
in England or in this country.
The debts of a municipality are not extinguished by the repeal of its charter and
the granting of a new charter to the same corporators, accompanied by the transfer
to the new corporation of the municipal property.
Where, after the repeal of a municipal charter, the same people and the same
territory are reincorporated as a municipality under a new name, although with
different powers and different officers, a suit pending against the old corporation at
the date of the repeal may be revived against the new corporation.
A. provision in the statute granting the new charter, that the new corporation
shall not.pay or be liable to pay any debt created by the extinct corporation, impairs the obligation of contracts, and is therefore unconstitutional and void.
Whether in such case the legislature may withhold from the new corporation the
taxing power as against debts contracted by the old corporation, not decided. '

DEIURRER to seire facias to revive suit. The facts were as follows: By the Act of 1879, ch. 10, the legislature repealed certain
charters of municipal corporations, and, among others, the charter
of the city of Memphis. The repealing act contained no provision
for the revivor of suits against any representative or successor of
the city.

By an act passed the same day, the several communities

embraced in the territorial limits of the municipal corporations
whose charters were thus abolished, were created taxing districts,

"in order to provide the means of local government for the peace,
The community
safety and general welfare of such districts."
embraced in the territorial limits of the city of Memphis became,

by the act, the taxing district of Shelby county, and organized
under it. The Supreme Court subsequently held, as the result,
that the charter of the city of Memphis had been validly repealed,
and that the same people and the same territory had been consti-
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tutionally reincorporated as a municipality: Luehrman v. Taxing
-Districtof Ahelby County, 2 Lea 425.
At the time of the passage of these acts, the present suit against
the city of Memphis was pending on the docket of the Supreme
Court by appeal from the Chancery Court. At the succeeding
term, on motion of the complainant, a scirefacias was issued in
the case, requiring the taxing district of Shelby county to show
cause why the suit should not be revived against it. The taxing
district demurred to the scire facias.
William M. Randolph, for plaintiff.
C. V. Heiskcell, J. B. Heiskell and George Gantt, for defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
COOPER, J.-The scirefacias in this state is a statutory mode
of reviving suits in this court, as well as the inferior courts,
against the heir, representative, assign or "other successor" of a
deceased party: Code, sect. 2853, et seq. It has not been denied
that the seire facias would lie in this case, if the taxing district
could be brought in for the purpose of being proceeded against as
a proper defendant. The argument in support of the demurrer
is rested upon the ground that the new corporation sustains no
such relation to the old corporation, as to authorize any proceeding
against it in any mode for a debt of the latter. It is also said,
that if the corporations are the same, no revivor is necessary.
iBut if this be conceded, the complainant would still have the
right, by suggestion of record, or otherwise, to .bring the facts
before the court, so that the further proceedings might be in the
right name. In this view, the scire facias may be treated as a
notice, and, in the absence of any special objection to the form of
the proceedings, as sufficient to raise the issue to be determined :
-East Tennessee, "5e., Railroad Co. v. Evans, 6 Heisk. 607. The
real question is whether the new corporation is the same as the
old corporation, or so far its successor as to be liable for its debts.
It was the received doctrine at one time, that by the principles
of the common law, upon the civil death of a corporation, its real
estate reverted to the original grantor, or his heirs, the debts due
to and from it were extinguished, and its personal property vested
in the state. The law was so stated, arguendo, in some of our
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cases: White v. Campbell, .5 Humph. 88; Tngqraham v. Terry, 11
Id. 572; ffoplkihs v. Whitesides, 1 Head. 31. There is reason
to doubt whether the decisions of the courts ever justified such a
statement of the law: Bacon v. _obertson, 18 How. 480. And
it is now well settled, both in England and in this country, that
equity will, upon the dissolution of a corporation by the expiration
of its charter or otherwise, impound its property, real and personal, and appropriate it, first, to the payment of its debts, and
then for the benefit of the stockholders. The law now is, independent of statute, that upon the civil death of a corporation, its
real estate does not revert to its original owners,, the debts due to
and from it are not extinguished, and its personal property does
not vest in the state. This court, in accordance with all the
modern rulings, has expressly so held: State v. Bank of Tennessee, 5 Baxt. 101.
Looking only to the fact that a corporation is created by its
charter, it is logically correct to say that each corporation called
into being by an independent charter is a distinct entity. From
this premise it has been ingeniously and ably argued that two successive corporations cannot be connected together any more than
two human beings, born successively, can be treated as one. But
if the doctrine of metempsychosis be admitted, the identity of
individuals would be possible by the transmigration of the essential part, and their succession in rights and liabilities is recognised
by law. And the legislature and the courts have settled the
continuity of corporations by the transfer of their material parts,
whether by identity or succession is practically immaterial,
although the old charter may be expressly repealed and an
entirely new charter granted.
It has been loosely said that whether a legislative charter will
operate to revive and continue an old, or to create a new and distinct corporation, depends upon the intention of the legislature.
More accurately it has been said, we must look to the terms of the
charter, and give them a construction consistent with the legislative intent and the intent of the corporators. Both forms of
expression are an adaptation of the language of Judge STORY in
the case of a private corporation, where the corporate name of the
new creation and some of the corporators were the same as those
of a then existing corporation. but the residue of the corporators
and the corporate property were not the same: Bellows v. Hallo-
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well Bank, 2 Mason 43. But in no case have the courts ever
failed to declare the identity or succession or continuity of the two
corporations, where the same corporators and the same corporate
property have passed to the new corporation. The "terms of the
charter" have, in such cases, never been construed otherwise.
In reference to municipal corporations, the rule from the earliest
times has been that a change of name or function would not affect
obligations: Luttrel's Case, 4 Rep. 87 b; Haddock's Case,
Raym. 439. Entirely new charters, upon a total cessation of user
for years under an old charter, have been held to have no greater
effect: Colehester v. Seaber, 3 Burr. 1866. "Many corporations,"
says Lord MANSrIELD in this last case, "for want of legal magistrates, have lost their activity and obtained new charters; and yet
it has never been disputed but that the new charters revive and
give activity to the old corporation. Where the question has
arisen upon any remarkable metamorphosis, it has always been
determined that they remain the same as to debts and rights."
The statute books of this state are full of instances where new
charters have been granted to municipal corporations upon an
express or implied repeal of the old charter, with a change of
name and organization, and the continuity of the corporations,
"as to debts and rights," never doubted. A striking instance is
found in the history of the municipal corporation now before us.
In 1849, the people and territory of the " City of Memphis" and
of the town of "South Memphis" were reincorporated under the
name and style of the "Mayor and Aldermen" of the city of
Memphis, by an act which expressly repealed all laws to the contrary, the previous charters of the separate corporations being
thereby repealed, as was held by this court: -Daniel v. Mayor,
&e., of Menpkis, 11 Humph. 582. The conclusion of Mr. Justice
FIELD on this subject is warranted by all the authorities: "When
a new form has been given to an old municipal corporation, or such
a corporation is reorganized under a new charter, taking in its new
organization the place of the old one, embracing substantially the
same corporators and the same territory, it will be presumed that
the legislature intends a continued existence of the same corporation, although different powers are possessed under the new charter,
and different officers administer its affairs; and, in the absence of
express provision for their payment otherwise, it will also be presumed in such case that the legislature intended that the liabilities,
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as well as the rights of property of the corporation in its old form,
should accompany the corporation in its reorganization: Broughton
v. Pensacola, 93 U. S. 266. To the same effect in substance are
Milner v. Pensacola, 2 Wood 638; Erustees v. Oity of Brie, 31
Pa. St. 515; Shankland v. Phillips, 8 Tenn. Oh. 556; Olney v.
Harvey, 50 Ill. 453; Girardv. Philadelphia,7 Wall. 1. Neither
the repeal of the charter of a municipal corporation, nor a change
of its name, nor an increase or diminution of its territory or population, nor a change in its mode of government, nor all of these
things combined, will destroy the identity, continuity or succession
of the corporation, if the people and territory reincorporated constituted an integral part of the corporation abolished. The reason
is to be found in the peculiar nature of such corporations. A
charter for municipal purposes is an investing of the people of a
place with the local government thereof, constituting an imperium
in imperio, and the corporators and the territory are the essential
elements, all else being mere incidents or forms: Cuddon v. Eastwick, I Salk. 192; Luehrman v. Taxing -District,2 Lea 425;
People v. Morris, 13 Wend. 325; People v. Hurlburt, 24 Mich.
44, 88; New Orleans Railroad Co. v. City of New Orleans, 26
La. Ann. 478. And precisely as a change in the form of government, or even the conquest of a state, will not affect its rights or
liabilities, whatever may be the incidental modifications, so neither
will a change of the lesser empire. The property held by such a
corporation for public use cannot be subjected to the claims of
creditors, and is only held by it as trustee. The only means at its
disposal for the payment of debt consist, ordinarily, of the taxes
which it is authorized to raise froin the persons, property and business within its territorial limits. The persons and property, or,
as said above, the corporators and the territory, are the essential
constituents of the corporation, and rights and liabilities naturally
adhere to them.
The courts have accordingly held that creditors may follow these
constituents even when divided out among other distinct municipalities, the original debtor corporation being abolished. As
long as the old corporation continues to exist, although shorn of
its proportions, the creditor may, and, according to some authorities, must, look exclusively to it: Howard v. Horner, 11 Hum.
532; Laramie County v. Albany County, 92 U. S. 207. A
qualification of the latter part of the rule may be assumed,
VOL. XXX.-24
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although the point seems never to have arisen in judgment, where
the municipality has been so reduced in population and territory
as to be unable to meet its liabilities. If, however, two new townships are created out of an old one, it has been held that a
judgment-creditor of the latter may revive his judgment by seire
faeias against each of the new townships, subject to only one
satisfaction: Plunkett Creek Township v. Crawford, 27 Pa. St.
107. So, where one town was abolished by statute, and its
population and territory unequally divided between two others, a
creditor of the old town was held entitled, by bill, to charge each
of the new towns with its proportion of the debt: .JIountPleasant
v. Beckwith, 100 U. S. 514. "The effect of the annulment,"
says Mr. Justice CLIFFORD in this case, "and annexation will be

that the two enlarged corporations will be entitled to all the public
property and immunities of the one that ceases to exist, and that
they will become liable for all the legal debts contracted by her
prior to the time when the annexation is carried into operation."
This court has reached the same conclusion in the case of a school
district divided between other districts: Bank v. Baber, 6 Lea
-.
See also, Distriet of Columbia v. Cluss, 103 U. S.705. In
view of the plenary powers of the legislature over municipal or
quasi-municipal corporations, and the necessity of its frequent
exercise according to public exigency, the wisdom of these rulings
is obvious.
It has been argued that the liabilities of a dissolved corporation
only follow its territory and population into a new corporation in
the absence of any legislation on the subject, and that the legislature may expressly provide otherwise. But there is no warrant
for the argument, either in reason or authority. Some of the
learned judges, in delivering the opinion of the court in particular cases, have taken care, as was right and proper in a question of so much importance, to limit the decision to the very case
before them, and have said that the result reached would follow,
"at any rate, in the absence of any declaration of legislative
intent to the contrary." No intimation has been given that if
there was such declaration the decision would be different. Mr.
Justice FiELD expresses the opinion in the Pensacola Case, that
the liabilities will accompany the corporation in its new form, "in
the absence of express provision for their payment otherwise."
So Mr. Justice CLIFFORD'S expression is that "the legislature
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may regulate the subject ;" that is, as the context snows, may proportion the liabilities between the new corporations, as its wisdom
may suggest. Neither of these eminent judges, nor has any judge,
intimated, much less decided, that the legislature could interfere
with the rights of creditors, or the legal results of the legislation.
On the contrary, every judge has, in view of the provision of the
Constitution of the United States, unhesitatingly said that the
legislature could not impair the obligation of the creditor's contract. If it were otherwise, the legislature might simply repeal
the charter of a municipal corporation, and at once reincorporate
the same people and territory under a similar corporation, and cut
off all creditors by adding that the new corporation should not be
liable for the debts of the old corporation. Such legislation would
be obnoxious to the Constitution of the United States (art 1, sect.
10) and the Constitution of the state (art. 1, sect. 20, and art. 11,
sect. 8). Even the right acquired by a pending suit cannot be
affected by such legislation: Code, sect. 49 ; Fisher v. _Dabbs, 6
Yerg. 119. And the legislature cannot do indirectly what it is
not at liberty to do directly.
In the act repealing the charter of the city of Memphis there is
a provision transferring the public property of the city to the
"custody and control of the state, to remain public property for
the uses to which it had been previously applied." By the act
reincorporating the same community and the same territory in the
name of the taxing district, this property is again transferred to
the custody and control of the governing board of the new corporation, to remain public property for the like uses. The city of
Memphis seems to have owned no other property. Confining ourselves, for the present, to these provisions of the act, the substance
of what was done was, that the people and territory of the repealed
corporation were at once reincorporated into a municipal corporation, and given possession of all the property of the old corporation for the same public use. The new corporation is identical
with the old corporation in all its essential elements. A change
in the form of the government would be unimportant. Unless,
therefore, there is something else in the charter to take the case
out of the rule, rights and liabilities would remain as before.
The act incorporating the taxing district expressly prohibits the
governing agencies from levying taxes for any purpose, reserving
that power in the legislature. It further provides that the local

O'CO1'NOR v. CITY OF MEMPHIS.

government shall not "pay or be liable to pay any debt created
by said extinct* corporation, nor shall any of the taxes collected
under the act ever be used for the payment of any of said debts."
The latter provision is itself a legislative recognition of the
identity, continuity or succession of the two corporations, for
otherwise it would. have been useless. Aiid the question comes to
this, can the legislature, where the corporations are substantially'
the same, according to the terms of the charter as construed by
the courts, chainge the legal effect of what has been done, by positive mandate that the new corporation shall not be liable for the
debts of the old? If it can, it would logically follow that the
legislature could prohibit a corporation from paying its own debt.
It has no such power. Such a prohibition is simply void: Wolff
v. New Orleans, 103 U. S. 358. And in this case, under the
circumstances, the provision in question is amenable to the constitutional objection that it undertakes to impair the obligation of
contracts. Whether the legislature can withhold the taxing power
as against debts previously contracted, is a grave question not now
before us. It may be that the creditor cannot collect his debt,
but, to use the language of Judge CLIFFORD in the Beckwith Case,
"he ought always to be able by some proper action to reduce his
contract to judgment." The creditor should have this right in
the present case, both for the purpose of reaching his share of the
assets which may be realized by the receiver, and to have the
benefit of future legislation. The courts can never presume
the permanent repudiation by the state of an honest demand.
This court has decided that the holder of a valid claim on the
treasury of the state is entitled to compel the controller to issue
him a warrant therefor, although it cannot be paid without an
appropriation for the purpose by the legislature, and no such
appropriation has been made.
We express no opinion on any point not now before us. All
we undertake at present to decide is, that the taxing district of
Shelby county is so far the successor of the late corporation of the
city of Memphis, or the same corporation under a new name, that
a suit, pending against the old corporation, may be revived against
the new, and prosecuted to judgment.
The decision in the principal case is
a departure from the old doctrine of the
common law, recognised in Tennessee

as recently as 1858, when Judge CAsuTHu-S, in the case cited from I Head,
following WMite v. Campbell, 5 lumph.

O'CONNOR v. CITY OF MEMPHIS.
38, declared unqualifiedly that in case of
dissolution of a corporation, "the debts
due to and from the corporation are all
extinguished, without some provision in
the charter, or some general law to prevent it." And, of course, if the debt
was extinguished, the suit should abate.
In the case followed, the court declared
that upon the civil death of a corporation by the expiration of its charter, its
unsold real estate reverts back to the
original grantor or his heirs, the debts
due to and from the corporation are all
extinguished and its personal estate vests
in the state; quoting approvingly the
language of Chancellor KENT to that
effect in 3 Com., p. *307. And in
the intermediate case of Ingraham v.
Terry, 11 Humph. 571, Judge TuELnEI
said : "It is not to be deemed that, as
a general principle, the dissolution of a
corporation by the expiration of its charter pendente lite is an abatement of the
suit, which cannot be renewed unless
provision is made for such contingency
in the charter ;" and, by analogy, if the
dissolution were by repeal, then the suit
would abate, unless provision to the contrary were made in the act of repeal.
No "general law to prevent is" has
since beedf enacted in Tennessee ; and it
results that what was declared by Chancellor KENT to be "the old settled law
of the land," and, as such, followed by
the courts of Tennessee, has by this decision been overturned ; and hereafter
no "special statutory provision to the
contrary" is necessary to prevent the
abatement of a suit against a defunct
corporation when a successor can be
ftund.
The decision is doubtless in accord
with the tendency and reasoning of the
recent cases in the federal and many
state courts, and in harmony with the
spirit of the age, which, lacking the
sacred veneration for the old common
law, so much revered by our ancestors,
which characterized judges formerly, is
not satisfied with the statement of any

person as to what is "settled law," but
in law, as in philosophy and religion, is
ever demanding a re-investigation, a new
revision and a satisfactory analysis according to the rules of modern science;
and it also accords with the controlling
sentiment of the country, which conforms
to the just and imperious demands of
commerce, that public obligations shall
be as sacredly kept as private ones, and
property, on the faith bf which debt has
been incurred, shall be subjected to its
satisfaction, the "settled law of the
land" to the contrary notwithstanding.
More than that, it is safely grounded
upon the articles of both the federal and
state constitutions, which forbid legislation impairing the obligation of contracts.
The old holdings on this question in
other states seem to have been generally
in accord with the doctrine declared by
Chancellor KENT to be settled law. In
the earlier editions of Angell & Ames on
Corporations, the law is stated without
question or qualification, as declared by
him; and it is added (sect. 779):
"Upon the dissolution of a corporation
in iany mode, it follows therefore that all
suits for or against it abate." So, too,
in England. In the last century Blackstone says (vol. i., p. *484): "The
debts of a corporation, either to or from
it, are totally extinguished by its dissolution."
Notwithstanding the weight of authority of such distinguished names as these,
a careful examination will disclose that
Judge COOPER is warranted in expressing the doubt "1whether the decisions of
the courts ever justified such a statement
of the law ;" and will also discover that
with the text-writers and judges there is
much of doubt and indecision in regard
to the effect of dissolution upon the debts
of a corporation. The apparent confusion of the law upon the subject has
resulted probably from two causesfirst, the failure to keep prominent the
distinction between the various kinds
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of corporations,

eleemosynary, muni-

cipal and private, and their difference
in history, purposes, functions and powers ; and, second, an omission to observe
the marked difference between the powers
of Parliament and of Congress, and the
probable bearing of our constitutional
guaranty of the obligation of contracts
upon all questions arising under legislative dissolution, which Judge DILLOx is
of opinion is the only American method.
Vide supra.
If the decisions of the courts did not
warrant such a statement of the law as
Blackstone and Kent both make, it is then
interesting to know from what source
they derive their authority for such
declarations. The latter doubtless relied upon the former for his statement;
and he, in turn, had probably relied
upon Lord CoKE. Blackstone precedes
his statement of the effect of dissolution
upon the debts of a corporation with a
declaration of its effect upon its lands:
"The body politic may also be dissolved
in several ways, which disrolution is the
civil death of the corporation; and in
this case their lands and tenements shall
revert to the person, or his heirs, who
granted them to the corporation."
The
earliest annotator cites Co. Litt. 13, to
support this declaration, where Lord
CoxE says: "And so if land be given
in fee simple to a deane and chapter, or
to a mayor and commonalty, and to their
successors, and after such body politique
or incorporate is dissolved, the donor shall
have again the land, and not the*lord
by esceate."
Burnet says (Hist. of Ref., vol. i., p.
261), it was much doubted, upon the
dissolution of the abbeys, "whether
the lands that formerly belonged to the
religious corporation ought to have returned to the founders and donors by
way of reverter, or to have fallen to the
lords of whom the lands were holden,
by way of escheat, or to have come to
the Crown."
And the editors of Co.
Litt. cite several cases as contrary to

Lord CoxE's statement of the law upon
this subject. The solution of the question was perhaps rendered more difficult
by the variety of the acts dissolvi~g the
orders of knights and disposing of their
property, passed by Parliament during
the reign of Edward II. and succeeding
reigns, referred to in the marginal notes
of Co. Litt., 13, b, and also of the
sweeping acts of confiscation in the reign
of Henry VIII., adopted by a subservient and jealous Parliament to destroy
the abbeys, and thus give legal sanction
to their lawless despoliation and the
avaricious appropriation of their property to gratify the tyrannous rapacity
of "the king with a pope in his belly,"
some of them perhaps providing for
reverter, others prescribing escheat, and
yet others declaring forfeiture."
Whatever may have been the state of
the law with regard to religious and
eleemosynary corporations, it is notable
that no statute or decision is cited to
support Lord CoKE's application of the
doctrine of reversion to municipalities;
and it may well be doubted whether
such ever existed. It is more probable
that it took its origin in this declaration
of his that the law was the same in the
case of an "abbot and his successors,"
"a deane and chapter I'and "a mayor
and commonalty ;" and that he was constrained thereto by the excessive fondness
for analogy and generalization which
characterized the old common-law judges
and lawyers, and especially this greatest
of them, and by the demands of the
feudal proprietors and system for a rule
of law that should govern realty in every
imaginable case.
The disposition of the realty of a
defunct municipality, however, is more
interesting to the curious than important
to the settlement of this question, as,
whatever became of it, creditors were
so little respected in tho-e days that
there was no probability of their receiving aught from it. What was to
become of their personal estate, and of
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their debts and credits, was of more
interest to them, and has bearing upon
this question. In the argument of the
celebrated case of quo warranto against
the city of London to forfeit its charter
in the reign of Charles II., the learned
Pollesfen asserted that this question
was not settled b'y any adjudicated ease,
and was " non deqinitur in jure." Nor
was it defined in that case; for the
courts were relieved by act of parliament, annulling the sentence of forfeiture, from the embarrassment which its
execution would have involved. The
very able and exhaustive opinion of Mr.
Justice CA T LL in Bacon v. Robertson, 18 How. 480, also warrants Judge
CoormR in questioning whether the cases
had settled the law as declared by Blackstone. The case of Colchester v. Seaber,
3 Burr. 1866, cited in the opinion on
another point, does not aid in this branch
of the investigation. Therein, as stated
by Justice WIrrOT, the question was
" whether this corporation was dissolved
by the judgment of ouster against individuals," which lie quaintly answered
with a "God forbid I,, In this case the
dissolution is undoubted. The legislature had the power to dissolve, and
exercised it by the act of repeal. The
question in this case is, Does the dissolution work an abatement of the suit?
An examination of the recent textbooks, as well as the recent American
cases, disperses the cloud of doubt in
which the older cases and books leave it,
and it seems now as clear that the law
requires a negative answer, as a half
century ago; that it required an affirmative one. In the -later editions of Angell
& Ames, in a supplemental section (779,
a), it is stated that " the rule of common
law in relation to the effect of dissolution
upon the property and debts of a corporation has in fact become obsolete and
odious. Practically, it has never been
applied, in England, to insolvent or dissolved moneyed corporations. * * *
Indeed, it may well be doubted whether,

in the view at least of a court of equity,
it has any application to other than publieor eleemosynary corporations with
which it had its origin ;" and the author
concludes that without any statutory
authority a court of equity will lay hold
of the capital, property and debts of a
defunct moneyed corporation, as a trustfund, and, by virtue of its inherent
power to administer trusts, will apply
it first to the satisfaction of the claims
of creditors. To the same effect also is
Potter on Corp., sects. 699, 713, where
the same doctrine is seemingly extended
to municipal corporations as well as
moneyed or trading. And Judge DILLON (MNunic. Corp., sect. 113), says that
tQ avoid the disastrous results of the old
doctrine the English courts have recently
doubted whether corporations can be totally dissolved; and, regarding the rule
in America, lie says (sect. 114), "As
respects the creditors of a municipal
corporation, their rights are protected
from the legislative invasion by the
Constitution of the United States, and
no repeal of the charter of a nunicipal
corporation can so dissolve it as to impair the obligation of the contract, or,
it may probably be safely added, preclude the creditor from recovering his
debt."
The current of recent decisions fully
warrants these positive statements of the
text-writers in the case of private corporations. The opinion of the court in
the leading case of State v. Bank of Tennessee, 5 Baxt.101, expressly recognises
the doctrine that these debts are not extinguished by dissolution, thus in effect
overruling the earlier cases on this subject. And it may be doubted if, at this
time, the courts of any state in the Union
question the inherent power of a court
of equity to administer the affairs of a
defunct private corporation for the benefit of its creditors. No case is cited in
the opinion as a precedent for such action
in the case of municipal corporations,
and probably none was known to exist.
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The cases cited from the decisions of
the federal Supreme Court leave doubt
whether such would be the holding in
that court in case of a defunct municipality; and in Meriwether v. Garrett,
102 U. S. 472, wherein was involved the
rights of certain creditors of this very
city of Memphis, tie court expressly
withhold determination of the question
of the power of a court of equity over
taxes levied in obedience to contract
obligations or under judicial direction.
But none of the cited casts question the
right of a creditor to have a judgment
or decree in equity for the amount of
his debt, or the duty of a court of equity
to aid him in its recovery and satisfaction so far as possible under existing
laws.
In Wotft v. New Orleans, 103 U. S.
358, Mr. Justice FIELD, commenting on
an act of the legislature of Louisiana
restricting the taxing power of said city
so as to prevent it from paying debts
contracted on the faith that the power
of taxation would be exercised for their
payment, said: "The prohibition of the
Constitution against the passage of laws
impairing the obligation of contracts
applies to the contracts of the state, and
to those of its agents acting under it
authority, as well as to the contracts of
individuals. * * * The ideas of validity
and remedy are inseparable, and both
are parts of the obligation which is
guaranteed by the Constitution. The
obligation of a contract is the law which
binds the parties to perform their agreement." The act was accordingly declared unconstitutional and inoperative,
and a mandamus ordered to levy and
collect a tax. Under the reasoning of
this opinion, it is difficult to see how,
if no contemporaneous act of re-incorporation of the same people and territory
had been passed, and no provision made
for the payment of debts, the conclusion
could be escaped that the repealing act
was void because of its conflict with the
constitutional inhibition against impair-

ing the obligation of contracts. Wrhile
the city existed the creditor could recover
judgment, and by mandamus compel the
levy and collection of taxes for its satisfaction. This was the remedy which
guaranteed the obligation of the contract; if it were gone, and nothing
substantially as efficient substituted, the
obligation of the contract, i. e. the legal
process and remedy, which alone compels the debtor to perform his agreement,
is not only impaired, but entirely destroyed. No such extreme resort, however, seemed necessary in this case, as
the identity, continuity or successorship
of the two corporations was evident, and
left the court an easy way out of the
apparent dilemma of deciding an act of
repeal of the municipality unconstitutional, or of permitting the impairment
of a contract thereby ; and this was by
reviving against the successor in fact
and in right and power, as the successor
also in liability and duty. The conclusion of IMrI.Justice FIELD in the Pensacola Case cited, which, Judge CooPER
says, is "warranted by all the authorities,"I is predicated upon premises which
are as sound in logic as safe in law; and
the reasoning of both judge and justice
would seem to justify the conclusion that
in this case, as in Rex v. Pasmore, 3
Term Rep. 199, the new charter was a renovation of the old corporation, "with all
the debts and rights attached ;" but the
decision of the question did not demand
so much, and, as Judge COOPER remarks, there may be a grave question
of its correctness. Apparently, however,
there is little room to dout the correctness of the conclusion that the taxing
district is '' the successor" of the city
within the meaning of the statutes of
reviver in Tennessee, and, as such, liable to have the suit revived against it
and judgment entered 6n the debt.
The case of Mumma v. The Potomac
Company, 8 Peters 281, wherein a revivor was refused, has some points of
resemblance to this one, but the points
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of difference aro so marked that it cannot be cited as a precedent. Therein it
a as decided only that a judgment at

law against a corporation could not Le
revived against it after its dissolution.
H. H. INGERSOLL.
Knoxville, Tenn.

Supreme Court of Indiana..
THE STATE OF INDIANA v. CALVIN SMITH.
In an indictment for an assault and battery, it is necessary to allege that the
touching, striking or beating was done unlawfully.
A court cannot infer that a rude, insolent or angry touching was also unlawful.
It is not, however, necessary that the word "unlawful" should be used; but it
will be sufficient if another term of the same import and meaning is employed.

ON appeal from the Tipton Oircuit.
The indictment charged that the appellee, at a time and place
therein named, "did unlawfully commit an assault and battery
upon the person of one Michael E. Stokes, by then and there, in
a rude, insolent and angry manner, touching, striking, beating,
bruising and wounding him, the said Michael E. Stokes." The
appellee moved to quash the indictment, because it was not averred
that the touching was unlawful. The court below sustained the
motion, whereupon the state appealed.
The following is the statute under which the indictment was
framed: "Every person who, in a rude, insolent or angry manner,
shall unlawfully touch another, shall be deemed guilty of an
assault and battery, and upon conviction, shall be fined not exceeding one thousand dollars, to which may be added imprisonment
not exceeding three months."
The opinion of the court was delivered by
ELLIOTT, J.-It is undoubtedly true, as the appellee contends,
that an indictment for the offence of assault and battery must show
that the touching was unlawful: State v. Hurp y/, 21 Ind. 441;
Oranorv. State, 89 Id. 64. An indictment which does not show
this leaves out an important and essential ingredient of the
offence: Howard v. State, 67 Ind. 401. It has been repeatedly
decided that the court cannot infer that a touching charged to
have been unlawful was rude, insolent or angry, but that the
manner of the touching must be expressly stated: Slusser v. State,
71 Ind. 280; State v. Fright, 52 Id. 807; and there is certainly
VOL. XXX.-25
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stronger reason for holding that courts cannot infer that a rude,
insolent or angry touching was also unlawful. The presumption
is in favor of innocence and of the legality of facts, and the state
must always show some fact or facts countervailing this presumption. It is always necessary, therefore, to show that the touching
was unlawful; it is not, however, necessary that the word "unlawful" should be used. It will be sufficient if another term of the
same import and meaning is employed: State v. Trulock, 46
Ind. 289; Sloan v. State, 42 Id. 570; Adell v. State, 34 Id. 546;
Cander v. State, 17 Id. 307; carneille v. State, 16 Id. 232.
The state contends that, conceding it to be necessary to show
that the touching was unlawful, the indictment is still sufficient,
because that fact is properly stated.
The argument is that the word unlawfully as used in the clause,
"did then and there unlawfully commit an assault and battery
upon the person of one Michael E. Stokes," applies to and qualifies the allegations, "by then and there touching, striking and
beating the said Stokes." The appellee, upon the other hand,
argues that the- word unlawfully as used does not apply to the
specific acts of touching and striking described, but that in order
to have any such force, it should have preceded the word touching. It is, of course, immaterial in just what place a word or
allegation of the charging part of an indictment is found, provided
it forms part of the description of the offence charged.
An offence is properly charged by a statement of the material
facts which constitute it, and not by the statement of mere conclusions of law. The phrase" did then and there unlawfully commit
an assault and battery" is a mere conclusion of the pleader and
not the averment of a material traversable fact. The word unlawfully, as therein used, is confined in its application and meaning
to the general conclusion of the pleader that the accused did commit an assault and battery. The touching, striking and beating
are not averred to have been unlawful. It is charged tha the
touching was rude, insolent and angry, but it is not charged that
it was unlawful. The specific facts relied upon by the pleader
are, that there was a touching and that it was angry and insolent,
but there is no fact stated nor allegation made in that part of the
indictment which describes the offence from which it can be concluded as a matter of law that the touching was not lawful. The
pleader does, indeed, state 'generally his conclusion that the
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accused did unlawfully commit an assault and battery, but in stating the facts which he alleges constituted the offence, he wholly
omits to charge the essential fact of unlawfulness. If the touching was lawful, no offence was committed, and there is nothing
in the facts stated from which it can be inferred that the touching
was not entirely justifiable and lawful. The facts as stated do not
support the pleader's conclusion that an assault and battery was
unlawfully committed and without substantive facts for its foundation, the conclusion must go for naught. It was necessary to show
that the touching was unlawful, and as the indictment fails to do
this, the motion to quash was properly sustained.
Judgment affirmed.
A recent writer upon criminal pleading, referring tor the use of the word
" unlawfully," says: "The word ' unlawfully ' is not often of much value in
an indictment ; it only asserts a conclusion of law, which, if it arises out of the
facts set forth, is unnecessary ; and, if it
does not, is insufficient. But if a statute, in describing an offence which it
creates, uses that word, an indictment
framed on the statute is bad if that
word be omitted, and it is generally best
to insert it, especially as it precludes all
legal excuse for the crime :" Heard on
Criminal Pleading 159.
A clear distinction is here drawn between the use of the word in a commonlaw indictment and one founded upon a
statute. This distinction is drawn by
the judges in the early English reports,
and noticed by all writers upon criminal
law. The absolute necessity of the use
of the word, or its equivalent, in describing statutory crimes, seems to have
been held necessary because the statute
introduced a new crime, made that
criminal which before was not, and the
court would not hold an act criminal
unless it was so specifically alleged.
Since, in many states, all crimes are
statutory, it would seem that the rule
is followed while the reason for its use,
as distinguishing between general and
exceptional crimes, had ceased. How-

ever this may be, it will be seen that
the rule is correctly laid down in the
case reported, and is universally followed by the courts.
Hawkins says lie can find no express
authority for the use of the word " unlawfully" at common law : vol. ii., cb.
25, sect. 96; and he cites 1 Xeble 859,
and 2 Keble 715. -The point is not expressly adjudicated in these cases. There
counsel raised this (among several other)
objections to the indictment, but all their
objections were overruled without referring to any of them specially. And
Hawkins says it was expressly held that
its use was not necessary in an indictment for a riot, because the act itself
contained in the indictment so plainly
appears to be unlawful ; citing 2 R. Abr.
82 ; Cro. C. C. 43. At an early day,
in Indiana, the Supreme Court, speaking of a common-law indictment, said:
"An indictment must set forth an unlawful killing or it will be defective.
If it does describe the manner of killing,
so as to show clearly that it was unlawful, the insertion of the word ' unlawful'
is unnecessary; and, if it does not so
describe the killing, the word ' unlawful'
would not aid the description: Jery v.
The State, I Blackf. 395. This case is
approved in Weinzorpflin v. State, 7
Blackf. 195, although a different rule is
said to prevail in indictments founded
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on a criminal statute.

So in State v.

Bray, 1 Mo. 180, the word "unlawfully" was held not necessary : State v.
Williams, 3 Foster (N. H.) 321. And
where a statute merely divides a common-law crime into degrees and apportions the punishment, the indictment
does not follow the general rule concerning statutory offences ; charging the
crime as a common-law offence is sufficient: Davis v. State, 39 Ind 355.
Where an indictment is framed upon
a statute an entirely diffcrent rule prevails as to the use of the word "unlawfully."
"But where a statute uses the
word 'unlawfully'
in the description
of an offence, it is certain that an indictment grounded upon it must use the
word illicit?, or some other tantamount :"
2 Hawk. Ch. 25, sect. 96; Commonwealth
v. Twitchell, 4 Cush. 74; C(urtus v. The
People, Breese (Ill.), 2d ed. 256 ; Barber v. The State, 13 Fla. 675. No aathority is cited to maintain this proposition, but it is assumed as an unquestionable fact. Chitty cites Bac. Abr.,
"Indictment," G, 1, and Cro. 0. C. 43.
This position is not overthrown by the
case of Beatson v. Rushforth, 2 MUarsh.
(Eng.) 362, which was a case founded
upon a penal statute; nor by Doug. 699,
Ratcliffe v. Eden, Cowp. 485, or by The
King v. Judd, 2 T. R. 255 ; see King
v. Burnett, 4 M. & S. 272; Weinzorpflin
v. The State, 7 Blackf. 195. Where the
words of a statute were, " if any father
shall have sexual interourse with his
daughter, knowing her to be such," and
the indictment alleged that the defendant A unlawfully did ht.ve sexual intercourse with his daughter B, the said
B then and there knowing that she, the
said B, was his, the said A's daughter,"
it was held that this was insufficient,
,as not containing the averment of the
knowledge of relationship. The word
"cunlawfully"
was not equivalent
to the words of the statute, did not
constitute such averment, and added
nothing to the indictment: Williams v.

State, 2 Ind. 439. But it was held that
in an indictment based upon a statute,
"if an- person shall make an assault
with intent to commit murder," &c.,
the word "1unlawfully" was unnecessary: State v. Williams, 3 Foster (N.
H.) 321 : so in Capps v. State, 4 Iowa
502. And it was said, in United States
v. Driscoll, 1 Low. 305, that "the word
'unlawfully ' is not often of much value
in an indictment."
This was spoken
with reference to an indictment framed
upon a statute. In other cases its use
has been held necessary: Commonwealth
v. Sholes, 13 Allen 554. And alleging
that the act was done unlawfully does
not dispense with a statement of the
facts constituting the offence: Com,nonweealth v. Byrnes, 126 Mass. 248.
But if the statute does not define the
crime, but speaks of it by name only, a
common-law indictment is sufficient; the
word 5'unlawful" is not essential: Perry
v. The People, 14 Ill. 499 ; see Weinzoqiflin v. The State, 7 Blackf. 195. In
a case decided in 1863, the indictment
charged that the defendant "did then
and there wear, and carry concealed
about his person, a dangerous and
deadly weapon."
The statute was that
any one who shall be convicted of wearing, or carrying concealed, any dangerous or deadly weapon shall be fined, &c.
The word " unlawful " was not used in
the statute; and it was held that the
indictment was sufficient: The State v.
Swope, 20 Ind. 106. So, where the indictment charged that A "I did then and
there strike, beat and wound, in a rude
and insolent manner, with intent then and
there, the said B, purposely, feloniously,
and with premeditated malice, to kill
and murder," framed upon the statute
quoted above, it was a sufficient charge
of assault and battery: State v. Murphy,
21 Ind. 441.
And the word "unlawful"
may be
used instead of another technical term.
Thus, it was held synonymous with the
word "illegal:"
State v. E'ayworth, 3

